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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Sandra Jonas appeals from the order summarily dismissing her 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
"After Jonas shot and dismembered Meta Marie Jones and enlisted 
Jonas's seventeen-year-old daughter to help dispose of the body in a canal, 
J;nas pied guilty to second degree murder."1 Jonas v. State, Docket No. 35748, 
2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 428 at p.1 (April 14, 2010). The district court 
imposed a unified life sentence with 25 years fixed. (R., pp.52-53.) Jonas 
subsequently filed "a motion for new trial under I.C.R. 34" and "an alternative 
motion for leave to withdraw her guilty plea," which was denied. (R., p.53.) 
Jonas also filed a post-conviction petition and an amended petition, 
raising four claims: (1) invalid guilty plea "due to coercion and lack of knowledge 
of evidence against her;" (2) denial of the "right to counsel during the second 
interview for the pre-sentence investigation;" (3) counsel failed to notify the court 
of objections to the presentence report; and (4) a "conflict of interest." (See R., 
pp.54-55, 63-71.) The district court summarily dismissed Jonas' petition on 
August 26, 2008. (R., p.52.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion 
issued April 14, 2010. Jonas, supra. 
1 The state originally charged Jonas with first-degree murder and filed a notice of 
intent to seek the death penalty. See Register of Actions, State of Idaho v. 
Sandra Jonas, Jerome County Case No. CR-FE-1998-0000162. 
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On May 12, 2011, Jonas filed a pro se successive petition alleging a 
variety of claims including "self defense/actual innocence," ineffective assistance 
of counsel, "new evidence," misconduct, "constitution [sic] violations," conspiracy, 
and "duress." (R., pp.3-4.) Jonas also filed a motion requesting counsel, which 
the district court granted in order to provide Jonas "with adequate resources to 
narrow her petition and present a potentially valid claim." (R., pp.22, 33.) At the 
same time, the court advised Jonas of its notice of intent to dismiss her 
successive petition. (R., p.31.) 
Appointed counsel filed an amended petition alleging counsel in Jonas' 
original post-conviction case was ineffective for failing to verify Jonas' original 
petition and failing to assert certain facts from Jonas' "underlying criminal case," 
which Jonas contends her trial attorneys failed to investigate. (R., pp.42-45.) In 
her amended petition, Jonas further contends her trial attorneys never advised 
her "of a potential self-defense or defense of other defense," and that her original 
post-conviction counsel "failed to investigate and challenge the facts as 
contained in the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report" and failed to communicate 
with her to discover her "desire" to raise certain claims. (R., pp.47-48.) Jonas 
subsequently filed a "Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief," raising the same claims, but slightly modifying the language used in 
some of her "factual" allegations. (Compare R., pp.42-48 with pp.78-84.) 
The state filed an answer on June 13, 2012. (R., pp.108-110.) In its 
answer, the state asserted six "affirmative defenses" and asked "[t]hat each and 
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every claim made by Petitioner be, in all respects, denied and dismissed, and 
that Plaintiffs [sic] take nothing thereby." (R., p.109.) 
On June 20, 2012, the court entered an order dismissing Jonas' 
successive petition. (R., pp.112-120.) In its order, the court stated: 
Petitioner's original successive petition stated eighteen 
grounds for post-conviction relief, many of which had already been 
raised in prior motions or were not actionable claims under the 
Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA). The original 
petition was supported only by Petitioner's statement of facts. This 
Court addressed the original successive petition in its Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss, which is incorporated herein by reference. The 
Amended Petition condensed these claims into one multi part claim 
of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, which will be 
addressed in this opinion. 
(R., pp.113-114.) The court then set forth standards applicable to post-
conviction petitions and explained that although Jonas' complaints about post-
conviction counsel were not grounds for relief, they could "provide sufficient 
reason for permitting newly-asserted allegations or allegations inadequately 
raised in the initial petition to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction petition." 
(R., p.115.) The court concluded, however, that Jonas' complaints about her 
previous post-conviction attorney did not constitute a sufficient reason to pursue 
her ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a successive petition. (R., pp.116-
117.) 
Despite finding summary dismissal of Jonas' successive petition was 
proper based on Jonas' failure to provide a sufficient reason entitling her to 
pursue a second petition, the court also addressed Jonas' "assertions as to 
counsel in the underlying criminal case" and determined Jonas failed to meet 
"her burden of showing prejudice." (R., pp.117-118.) 
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On July 9, 2012, the court entered an amended order dismissing Jonas' 
successive petition, which added some procedural history along with a "Rule 
54(b) Certificate,"2 but was otherwise the same as its initial dismissal order. (R., 
pp.121-130.) Jonas filed a timely notice of appeal from the amended order. (R., 
pp.132-133.) 
2 Because the court dismissed Jonas' successive petition in its entirety, a 
certificate pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) does not seem to apply. This Court may, 
therefore, wish to order a temporary remand in this case for entry of a final 
judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
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ISSUE 
Jonas states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied the 
successive post conviction relief petition on grounds different than 
those contained in the notice of intent to dismiss. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Jonas failed to show error in the summary dismissal of her 
successive post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Jonas Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of Her Petition 
A. Introduction 
The district court summarily dismissed Jonas' successive post-conviction 
petition because she failed to show a sufficient reason to overcome the 
prohibition against successive petitions. (R., pp.112-128.) The court also 
addressed the merits of Jonas' ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim and 
concluded the claim should be summarily dismissed. (R., pp.127-128.) Jonas 
claims the court erred in dismissing her petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908 
because, she argues, the court's notice did not include that as a ground for 
dismissal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.) Jonas also argues that dismissal 
cannot be affirmed on the alternative ground cited by the court, i.e., that her 
allegations regarding trial counsel were inadequate to suNive summary 
dismissal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20.) Application of the law to the facts of the 
case show both of Jonas' claims fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
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C. Jonas Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of Her 
Successive Petition 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "The district court cannot dismiss on its own motion if it does not give 
the parties a twenty-day prior notice stating its reasons for doing so as required 
by Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b)." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 
1148, 1151 (2009) (citing Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P.3d 445 (2003)). 
"This procedure is necessary so as to afford the applicant an opportunity to 
respond and to establish a material fact issue." Flores v. State, 128 Idaho 476, 
478, 915 P.2d 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 
319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995)). 
"A successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily 
dismissed if the grounds for relief were finally adjudicated or waived in the 
previous post-conviction proceeding. I.C. § 19-4908." Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 
438, 441, 128 P .3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006). "Such grounds may be re-
litigated, however, if the petitioner shows sufficient reason why they were 
inadequately presented in the original case." 19...:. Although ineffective assistance 
of counsel in an original post-conviction action "is not grounds for post-conviction 
relief, an allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first post-
conviction action due to the deficiency of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, 
provides sufficient reason to permit the claims to be presented again in a 
subsequent petition." 19...:. (citations omitted). 
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The district court dismissed Jonas' petition because she "failed to 
demonstrate sufficient reason why her claims were inadequately raised or 
presented in the initial post-conviction petition." (R., p.126.) On appeal, Jonas 
contends dismissal on this basis was improper because, she argues, the court's 
notice of intent did not identify this as a potential ground for dismissal. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.17.) According to Jonas, the court's notice "complained only 
about the evidentiary insufficiency of the claims contained in the petition." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Jonas is incorrect. 
Although the court's notice did not specifically reference I. C. § 19-4908, 
the court noted Jonas' claims were "asserted in prior petitions and motions" and 
that Jonas failed to present "adequate grounds upon which to base a 
successive application for post-conviction relief." (R., p.31 (emphasis added).) 
In response, Jonas, with the assistance of counsel, alleged that prior post-
conviction counsel was ineffective in presenting Jonas' claim that trial counsel 
was ineffective. (R., pp.42-48, 78-85.) Thus, Jonas alleged facts in an effort to 
overcome the prohibition against successive petitions, indicating she understood 
she was required to do so in order to avoid summary dismissal. That she was 
ultimately unsuccessful in that endeavor does not mean she lacked notice. 
Jonas further argues "the dismissal cannot be upheld on the alternative 
grounds where the court purports to address the merits" because, she contends, 
the court "incorrectly equates the claim from her initial petition, to wit, that her 
attorneys failed to advise her of the evidence, with the claim in her instant 
petition, to wit, that her attorneys failed to investigate and so were unaware of 
8 
the evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) A review of Jonas' claims reveals the 
district court did not err in equating the two or in summarily dismissing her claim. 
"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject 
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's 
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-
4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must 
accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to 
accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho 
at 522,164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrierv. State, 135 Idaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110, 
112 (2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to 
relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to 
dismissing the petition. lg_,_ (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 
1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for 
the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the 
original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." lg_,_ 
To overcome summary dismissal of her ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, Jonas was required to demonstrate that "(1) a material issue of fact 
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exist[ed] as to whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a material 
issue of fact exist[ed] as to whether the deficiency prejudiced [Jonas'] case." 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 
(1984) (a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show both 
deficient performance and resulting prejudice). 
To establish deficient performance, the burden was on Jonas "to show 
that [her] attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was 
competent and diligent." kl "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-
guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation." kl To establish prejudice, Jonas was required to show "a 
reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different." kl 
"This Court applies the Strickland test when determining whether a 
defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea 
process." Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011) 
(citations omitted). "When a defendant alleges some deficiency in counsel's 
advice regarding a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." kl at 621, 262 P.3d at 264 
(quotations and citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of 
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claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea 
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky. 
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). 
In her original petition, Jonas asserted trial counsel failed to keep her 
"advised and informed of the status of the case, evidence against her, [and] 
steps being taken by counsel relative to her defense," which rendered her guilty 
plea invalid. (R., p.68.) In her successive amended petition, Jonas contends 
counsel never "investigated" the facts or if counsel did investigate, they "failed to 
review the information obtained by any investigator" and failed to advise her "of a 
potential self-defense or defense of others defense," which, she again claims 
resulted in an invalid plea. (R., pp.46-48.) While the two claims may be framed 
slightly differently, they both are premised upon the same basic assertion that 
Jonas' plea was invalid because counsel failed to adequately advise her in 
relation thereto - whether it was due to a lack of investigation, as she now claims 
(without any evidence to support such an assertion), or whether it was due to a 
failure to communicate, as she claimed in her original petition. Either way, the 
court's findings from the original post-conviction action, relied upon by the district 
court in this case, are relevant. Those findings are: 
[Jonas] asserts, as she did in her motion to withdraw her 
guilty plea, that she was not presented with the state's evidence 
against her and that she therefore could not have entered a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. The district court, in 
considering her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, addressed the 
merits of this contention. Specifically, the court highlighted the fact 
that the petitioner was present at her preliminary hearing and heard 
the evidence presented by the state at that hearing. The court also 
noted that the defendant was present at all or nearly all of the 
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hearings on the admissibility of evidence against her. The court, 
after hearing evidence on the motion, denied the motion. 
. . . [T]he record created by the proceedings on the motion 
to withdraw the guilty plea conclusively establishes that [Jonas] was 
aware of the evidence against her and entered a knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent plea. Furthermore, [Jonas] herself in her 
petition for post-conviction relief admitted that she did go over 
evidence with at least [one of her attorneys,] Ms. Paul. While it is 
true that [Jonas] asserts that Ms. Paul acted improperly in going 
over the discovery, the fact remains that [Jonas] acknowledges 
sitting down with her attorney and going through the evidence. 
This combined with the facts established in the record directly rebut 
[Jonas'] allegation that her guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent due to failure by counsel to inform [her] of the 
evidence against her. 
(R., pp.91-92.) 
Even if the court's findings from the original post-conviction case have no 
bearing on Jonas' current claim, which the state does not concede, the district 
court correctly concluded Jonas' failed to allege sufficient facts to entitle her to 
an evidentiary hearing on her ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Jonas 
has provided no evidence to support her claim that counsel failed to investigate 
her factual allegations or that had counsel performed additional investigation, 
they could have discovered "bullet projections consistent with [her]" version of 
events, exculpatory blood evidence, or that the victim was "quarrelsome, violent, 
dangerous and/or manipulative." (R., p.46.) Nor is there any basis for accepting 
Jonas' conclusory statement that she had a viable defense or that she would not 
have taken advantage of the offer to plead guilty to an amended charge of 
second-degree murder, rather than face the death penalty. 
The district court correctly concluded summary dismissal of Jonas' 
successive petition was appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Jonas' successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 20th day of June, 2013. 
JE 
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